

Airport Saturation, Satellites into the Future, and Emerging Drone Headaches

Dr. Bernardo Lisker
*International Aviation
Portfolio Director*

Mr. Frederick A. Niles
*Senior Technical Advisor for
Unmanned Aircraft Systems*




Cautionary Note

- This presentation is protected by copyright (The MITRE Corporation © 2019. All Rights Reserved). Reproduction is not authorized.
- This presentation was prepared by many engineers at MITRE, using a variety of sources, including much material that had already been prepared for various audiences. Therefore, minor inconsistencies in formatting and spelling may be detected.
- The material contained in this document has been prepared to be used as an aid by experienced MITRE briefers as part of their oral presentations. Exercise caution when reading these presentations, as use of these materials by other than the original presenters may result in diminished comprehension or misunderstandings.
- The presentation includes public videos that can be found on YouTube or similar sources. Where applicable, a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) has been included.
- If questions arise that require a response from MITRE, contact (in English or Spanish): Dr. Bernardo Lisker, International Director: bernard@mitre.org

MITRE y su centro de investigación aeroportuario y en control de tráfico aéreo civil

- Organización de investigación privada, no lucrativa
 - Orígenes en el Instituto Tecnológico de Massachusetts (MIT)
 - Laboratorio nacional de interés público creado en 1958
 - ~8000 profesionales en ingeniería, matemáticas y otras disciplinas
 - **Misión:** Objetividad e interés público



Presencia internacional de MITRE



Lista representativa:

Albania	India
Alemania	Indonesia
Arabia Saudita	Israel
Argentina	Italia
Armenia	Japón
Atlas Air	Letonia
Australia	Lituania
Bélgica	México
Brasil	Países Bajos
Bulgaria	Panamá
Canadá	Perú
China	Polonia
COCESNA	Portugal
Corea	Reino Unido
Dubái	República Checa
Ecuador	Rumania
Egipto	Singapur
EgyptAir	Suecia
Eslovaquia	Suiza
Eslovenia	Tailandia
España	Taiwán
Estonia	Uruguay
Filipinas	Venezuela
Francia	
Grecia	
Hungría	
IATA	

- Gestión de tráfico aéreo y flujos aéreos (ATM)
- Comunicación, navegación y vigilancia (CNS)
- Navegación satelital
- Diseño de trayectorias y espacio aéreo
- Modelado de capacidad, saturación de pista y ruido

Airport Capacity and Efficiency


Changing Technology and its Impact

Capacidad aeroportuaria en el “lado aire” y diseño moderno

- **Falta de espacio para construcción cerca de centros de pasaje**
 - Ruido acústico y “visual” vs. distancia y acceso
- **Treinta años: la diferencia entre 1990 y 2020**
 - El modelado y la simulación han sustituido tablas, reglas y manuales
 - La separación entre pistas ha disminuido continuamente
 - La navegación satelital ha cambiado todo tipo de conceptos
 - Los cuellos de botella ahora frecuentemente son en el espacio aéreo
- **El Aeropuerto Chicago O’Hare inició operaciones duales independientes (“simultáneas”) en los 1960s**
 - Medio siglo más tarde, solamente una docena de aeropuertos fuera de Estados Unidos utilizan operaciones independientes
- **El Aeropuerto de Denver inició operaciones triples independientes (“simuláneas”) en los 1990s**
 - Procedimiento exclusivamente utilizado en Estados Unidos

Pistas paralelas duales

Aproximaciones independientes (simultáneas) instrumentales




- **FAA:** Separación mínima entre ejes de pista de ~1100 m (para elevaciones bajo ~610 m)
- **OACI:** Separación mínima entre ejes de pista de ~1310 m (es obligatorio un estudio aeronáutico)

Aproximadamente 30 aeropuertos en EE.UU. y ~12 fuera de EE.UU. operan aproximaciones simultáneas duales

Pistas paralelas duales


Aproximaciones dependientes instrumentales



- **FAA:** Require una separación diagonal mínima de 1.0 NM para separación entre ejes de pista iguales o mayores de 760 m (separaciones mayores requieren mayores separaciones diagonales)
- **OACI:** Require una separación diagonal mínima de 1.0 NM para separación entre ejes de pista iguales o mayores de 915 m (separaciones mayores requieren mayores separaciones diagonales)

Pistas paralelas triples*

Aproximaciones simultáneas instrumentales




**Se requiere una separación mínima entre ejes de pista de ~1200 m
(para elevaciones bajo ~610 m; para mayores elevaciones es
requerido un estudio aeronáutico)**

**Cinco aeropuertos en EE.UU. operan rutinariamente
aproximaciones simultáneas triples**

*** Procedimiento FAA (no OACI)**


Pistas convergentes: aproximaciones por instrumentos (IMC) independientes*



MAP: missed approach point
(punto de aproximación frustrada o fallida)


*** Procedimiento FAA (no OACI)**

Pistas convergentes: aproximaciones por instrumentos (IMC) dependientes*



* Procedimiento FAA (no OACI)


Requerimientos de pista en base a niveles de saturación (*noción gráfica*)



Llegadas diarias (en días pico)

Operaciones anuales (normalizadas, sin picos) 356,302 (2007, real)

Conflictos entre aeropuertos




Niveles de ruido recomendados para zonificación

Zonificación	Niveles L_{dn} para zonificación (dBA)				
	45	55	65	75	85
Casas residenciales			Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable
Edificios residenciales			Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable
Escuelas, bibliotecas, iglesias			Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable
Hospitales, asilos			Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable
Auditorios, salas de conciertos		Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable	
Arenas deportivas			Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable
Parques		Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable	
Edificios de oficinas			Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable
Tiendas, cines, restaurantes			Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable
Fábricas				Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable
Granjas ganaderas			Normalmente aceptable	Normalmente inaceptable	Claramente inaceptable
Agricultura (sin ganadería), pesca				Normalmente aceptable	



Fuente: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)


Analyse du dispositif de circulation aérienne de Charles de Gaulle en configuration face à l'Est




60 dBA (vols Concorde exclus)

Navegación avanzada

Area Navigation (RNAV) y Required Navigation Performance (RNP)



Salidas de Dallas-Fort Worth



CSin RNAV

Aproximación simulada RNP AR


Palm Springs, California Airport (PSP)



Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Issues and Acceptance

Historical Retrospective



FAA Video

'Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. 13-3448'

Dangerous *Military*



**Unmanned aircraft or drones
became popular with the
military**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LI9SNt3Kv2k>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLFYdMWgrqI>

- **Persistent**
- **Keeps soldiers out of harm's way**



Dangerous, Dirty

Public Safety

Civil and commercial applications soon followed



National Park Service



City of Arlington, TX




Department of Homeland Security



Albemarle, NC


Dangerous, Dirty, + Decreased Costs

Infrastructure Inspection



Dangerous, Dirty, + Decreased Costs

Aerial Photography



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0OwbZRq2zk>

Dangerous, Dirty, + Decreased Costs *Agriculture*



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ydfPzqaNkuA>

© 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Dangerous, Dirty, + Decreased Costs Research



NASA

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VlbzUs>



Zbynek Burival



00:00:00:00

Dangerous, Dirty, + Decreased Costs *Communications Platform*

X Company – Project Loon



Dangerous, Dirty, + Decreased Costs *Package Delivery*



Dangerous, Dirty, + Decreased Costs ...Dramatic



MITRE Uses Small UAS for Airport Safety Assessments – Reducing Costs



MITRE Video

Urban Air Mobility

Example – Cora Aero (Kitty Hawk)



Larry Page's Flying Taxis, Now Exiting Stealth Mode



Andrew Ross Sorkin
DEALBOOK MARCH 12, 2018

The New York Times

Since October, a mysterious flying object has been seen moving through the skies over the South Island of New Zealand. It looks like a cross between a small plane and a drone, with a series of small rotor blades along each wing that allow it to take off like a helicopter and then fly like a plane. To those on the ground, it has always been unclear whether there was a pilot aboard.

Well, it turns out that the airborne vehicle has been part of a series of "st..."

<https://y2mate.com/youtube/LeFjRMv5U8>

Applications are Continuously Emerging

Examples

- **Public Safety**

- Search and rescue
- Law enforcement tactical operations
- Crime scene investigation
- Fire spotting
- Accident recreation
- Disaster response
- Infrastructure protection
- Security


- **Scientific**

- Natural hazards research/monitoring
- Environmental monitoring/mapping
- In-situ atmospheric monitoring
- Wildlife observation
- Technology experimentation

- **Commercial**

- Surveying/mapping/imaging
- Aerial photography/surveys
- Agricultural application
- Crop monitoring
- Motion picture
- High altitude imaging
- Communications relay
- Utility/pipeline patrol
- Traffic monitoring
- News/media
- Aerial advertising
- Fish spotting
- Parcel/cargo delivery

Regulatory Requirements



1. Airworthy aircraft



**2. Qualified personnel
and organization**




3. Operational approval

Principal Integration Challenges

Lack of “See and Avoid” Capability

**Airworthiness/
Certification**




Beyond Line-of-Sight

Radio Line-of-Sight

**ATM*/Airspace
Integration**


Source: MITRE Photo



Air Traffic Control (ATC)

*ATM = Air Traffic Management

**Command and
Control (C2)
Vulnerabilities**



Source: <http://www.af.mil/photos>

Crew

**Crew Qualifications
and Training**

Some Specific Challenges for UAS

- **Flight over people**
- **Beyond visual range operation of sUAS**
 - Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)
 - Low altitude, Class G airspace
 - Start with remote areas, e.g., Arctic, agriculture survey
- **Airport surface operations**
 - Including unmanned airport surface vehicles
- **Automated take off and landing**
- **Incorporation of non-traditional components**
 - Open-source software
 - Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS)
- **Autonomous flight**

Merging of Two Cultures

Information Technology

Innovation
Revolutionary
Speed to market
Entrepreneurial
Open
Minimally regulated
Risk rewarded

Technology
Innovations

Aviation


Safety
Evolutionary
Proven
Conservative
Proprietary
Tightly regulated
Risk avoided

Safest Mode of
Transportation



Used with Permission


Unmanned Aircraft



- Rapidly evolving technology
- Very dissimilar vehicles
- Designed for multiple purposes
- Wide variety of missions (ocean to urban)

U.S. FAA Integration Pilot Program (IPP)

"Pilot" = Exploratory



Presidential Order

White House Oversight

DoT Led Initiative

U.S. FAA Execution



Purpose: Advance Commercial Drone Operations

Key: Partnerships With State and Local Governments

Integration Pilot Program Scope

Ten partnerships established

- Variety of partners - cities, universities, states, tribal nations
- Different types of UAS applications
- Geographic diversity of locations



Integration Pilot Program Applications

- **Critical infrastructure inspection**
- **Law enforcement support**
- **Border protection**
- **Search and rescue**
- **Media reporting**
- **Agriculture support**
 - Wildlife management
 - Crop monitoring and precision application
- **Package delivery**
 - Medical
 - Food and commerce
- **Insurance claims support**
- **Pest control**
- **Aircraft inspection**
- **Airport perimeter surveillance**



Source: <http://insideunmannedsystems.com/reaching-for-the-horizon-ipp-alaska/>



Source: <https://www.thedrive.com/tech/22944/the-choctaw-nation-in-oklahoma-is-using-drones-to-trap-feral-pigs>



Source: <https://www.govtech.com/fs/automation/Wake-County-NC-First-to-See-Meds-By-Drone-Delivery-in-US.html>

Industry Participants



Logos are property of the respective owners

Shift in Thinking about Airworthiness

**Protecting the occupants
to an acceptable level of
risk**



**Protecting the people on
the ground or in other
aircraft**



Unsplash: Gerrie van der Walt



Unsplash: Nick Herasimenka

U.S. FAA




Unsplash: Meriç Dağlı

The Problem

Manned aircraft airworthiness design standards do not scale down to the sUAS environment


- **Very limited design standards for the sUAS industry**
- **Wide variety of aircraft, missions, and users**
- **Rapidly evolving technology**
- **Current rules are very restrictive for sUAS**
- **Waiver process is labor intensive, time consuming, and costly**




Current approach costs too much, takes too long, and lacks defined UAS standards

A Risk-Based Approach

Can a risk-based approach for sUAS airworthiness approval be developed that combines the aircraft and mission characteristics to ensure an acceptable level of safety?



Two Aspects of sUAS Risk




Source: MITRE

Example Outputs: Manned Aircraft Traffic around Buenos Aires

Risk Levels of a mid-air collision with manned air traffic below 1000 feet (ft) Above Ground Level (AGL)

Buenos Aires Example
1400-1500 (GMT-3)
90 Days of data



Unmitigated Collision Risk (UCR) (Collisions/Flight Hour)

No Traffic	UCR =	0.00E+00	Clear
Low	0.00E+00	< UCR ≤ 1.00E-08	Green
Medium	1.00E-08	< UCR ≤ 1.00E-07	Yellow
Medium-High	1.00E-07	< UCR ≤ 1.00E-05	Orange
High	1.00E-05	< UCR	Red

GMT = Greenwich Mean Time
MAC = Mid Air Collision
deg = degrees
TOD = Time of Day

Based on Flight Radar 24 and MITRE Global Flight Informatics (MGFI) data

Principal Enabling Technologies for UAS Flight Beyond Line of Sight

- **Detect and Avoid (DAA)**
- **Command and Control (C2) and communications**
- **Navigation**
- **Identification (ID)**
- **UAS Traffic Management (UTM)**

Methods of Traffic Detection

Cooperative

Requires intruder aircraft to be appropriately equipped

Non-Cooperative

Does not require intruder aircraft to be appropriately equipped

Passive


Broadcast Position (ADS-B)



Camera



Microphone




Active

Two-way communication systems




Radar




Location of Traffic Detection Sensor

Ground Based DAA




Airborne DAA




- Near-term capability, part of long-term solution
- Operations constrained to radar surveillance volume

- Long-term development
- Size, Weight, and Power (SWAP) requirement limits applicability to sUAS

UAS C2 and Communications Data




Industry Thinking



Icons: www.flaticon.com

Geofencing

- **Virtual 3 Dimensional boundary based upon position**
 - Exclusion or containment zone
- **Implemented within the UAS software**
- **New kind of navigation specification**
 - Area versus route
 - No recognized standards exist
- **Recognized mitigation**



https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/uas_facility_maps/

UAS Identification

- **UAS are tools that can be used with bad intentions**
- **In the 1950s the aircraft transponder was created to separate friend from foe**
- **The current sUAS rule does not require UAS to have electronic identification**
 - Security agencies became very concerned about unauthorized use
 - The inability to connect the unmanned aircraft to its pilot creates new challenges for law enforcement
 - Before expanding sUAS access, addressing the lack of electronic identification became a priority for rulemaking

UAS Identification Goals

- **Law enforcement worldwide must be able to determine owner/operator information of flying drone**
 - **Cost** is a major driver as, for example, there are over 18,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the U.S.
- **Nice to have: a capability for any citizen observing a drone operating in an undesirable fashion to get an identification code**
- **“Smart phones” are emerging as a potential receiver**


UTM: A Range of Management Concepts

**Tightly Controlled
Trajectory/Area De-conflictions**


**Loosely Controlled
Clear Rules of the Road
Common Operational Picture
Peer Communications**



Centralized



Decentralized



**Low Altitude
“UAS Traffic Management”**

An Example – Not an Endorsement



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uF-WXHwzURs>

What is Happening Here?

The system can determine its own flight path, avoid obstacles, and return to a safe landing place


- **Operator can select targets to track, items to film, or predefined panning paths**
- **The systems can choose the flight path**
- **A number of features:**
 - Obstacle avoidance
 - Visual navigation
 - 3 Dimensional (3D) mapping
 - Return-to-home



Auto-GCAS: Automatic Safety Net (Ground Collision Avoidance System)

CFIT* and GLOC* accidents

Six systems on the F-16 → CFIT rate unchanged



- Introduced in 2014 – Block 40/50
- Maneuver – Roll-to-upright and 5G* pull

Auto-GCAS Keys to success

- Design started with the pilot requirements
 - Nuisance budget
 - Maximum acceptable maneuver
 - Interface




*CFIT = Controlled Flight Into Terrain
 GLOC = G-force Induced Loss of Consciousness
 5G = Five times the force of gravity

Counter UAS (C-UAS)

MITRE Spectrum of sUAS Threat Characteristics

*GPS-Global Positioning System



Gatwick Airport Drone Incident

December 19-21, 2018


- **Caused major disruption, affecting approximately 140,000 passengers and 1,000 flights, At least two drones involved, required resources from seven police forces.**
- **Police believe attackers had 'detailed knowledge' of airport and have “identified, researched and ruled out 96 people of interest”.**
- **“I think what's clear from the last 24 hours is that drones are a UK aviation issue, or even an international aviation issue.”
Stewart Wingate, Chief Executive of Gatwick Airport**



Images: GatwickAirport.com

© 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Map of no-fly zone around Gatwick



Abqaiq–Khurais Attack in Saudi Arabia

September 14, 2019

- Drones used to attack Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities

The New York Times

Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by Drone Strike, and U.S. Blames Iran



ABQAIQ, SAUDI ARABIA SEPT. 14 REUTERS
Saudi Oil Facility Ablaze After Strikes
By Reuters




Image: U.S. Government Source, public domain

Multi-modal Counter UAS Approaches are Better

Modality	Legality*	Effectiveness	Pros	Cons
DETECT & DETERMINE				
Cameras	Green	Yellow	Target Identification, Computer vision is improving.	Operationally limited by line of sight and visibility. Technology limited by sensor resolution and performance of visual algorithms
C2 Signal Detection	Green	Yellow	Can sometime detect systems and extract information even before launch.	Automated flights do not require RF signature. Poor geolocation capabilities.
C2 Link Interception	Yellow	Yellow	Can give precise identity and location of sUAS.	Requires up to date library of sUAS and their vulnerabilities. Encryption improving. Legality without a warrant is unclear.
Radar	Yellow	Green	Detects sUAS at about 2km. Can distinguish sUAS from birds and ground vehicles.	Possible interference hazard. Difficult to detect multiple systems in tight formations or close to clutter (urban environments)
Microphones	Green	Red	Under ideal conditions, can distinguish sUAS from jets, vehicles, cars.	Very short range. Environment may have many other noise sources

**MITRE is not claiming legal expertise. Rough estimates only. Will vary by jurisdiction and circumstances.*


Multi-modal Counter UAS Approaches are Better

Modality	Legality*	Effectiveness	Pros	Cons
INTERDICT				
Projectile Net			Effective against automated and non-automated threats.	Limited range. Limited effectiveness against swarm.
RF Jamming			Effectiveness dependent on sUAS configuration.	Can interfere with local infrastructure. Easy to overcome through user-interface setting.
RF Cyber			Effectiveness dependent on sUAS configuration & model.	Susceptible to constantly changing protocols and to encryption.
GPS Denial+			Effective against most current threats.	Not effective against threats that do not rely on GPS (and instead use SLAM or object recognition)
Kinetic / LASER+			Effective against automated and non-automated threats.	Requires time on target and approvals. Debris poses safety risks.
Interceptor sUAS+			Cost effective. Scales with automated sUAS.	Very difficult with manual piloting, and automated sUAS are low TRL.

+ These technologies have not been field tested by MITRE

**MITRE is not claiming legal expertise. Rough estimates only. Will vary by jurisdiction and circumstances.*

Examples of MITRE Counter UAS Activities



SIMEX: Simulation experiments

TACTIC: Technical Assessment of C-UAS Technologies in Cities

Summary

- **UAS is a very complex topic that affects all aspects of aviation**
- **Commercial sUAS are here today and ready to provide value, improving our standard of living**
- **Flight Beyond Visual Line-Of-Sight (BVLOS) of the pilot is today's major challenge**
 - Risk Assessment: DAA, C2, UTM, Over-people, etc.
- **MITRE has been working these issues for more than twenty years and is recognized as a world expert**
 - We are here to help make the future a reality, safely and securely



Source: Creative Commons

MITRE

MITRE's mission-driven teams are dedicated to solving problems for a safer world. Through our federally funded R&D centers and public-private partnerships, we work across government to tackle challenges to the safety, stability, and well-being of our nation.

Learn more www.mitre.org

